Major League Broadcasting: The Deleterious Effects of Major League Baseball\u27s Antitrust Exemption on Nevada Consumers with No Home Team by Dunning, Andrew P. & Kleiman, Kerry E.
DUNNING - 16 NEV. L.J. 1171 - FINAL 6/20/2016  5:53 PM 
 
1171 
MAJOR LEAGUE BROADCASTING: 
THE DELETERIOUS EFFECTS OF MAJOR 
LEAGUE BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST 
EXEMPTION ON NEVADA CONSUMERS 
WITH NO HOME TEAM  
Andrew P. Dunning* & Kerry E. Kleiman** 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................  1172 
 I. A BRIEF PRIMER ON ANTITRUST LAW: WHAT ARE ANTITRUST 
LAWS, AND WHY SHOULD WE CARE? ..............................................  1173 
 II. MAJOR LEAGUE BROADCASTING RIGHTS .........................................  1174 
 A. “Home Television Territory” Organization for Major League 
Baseball.....................................................................................  1174 
 B. Regional Sports Networks .........................................................  1176 
 C. Major League Baseball Broadcasting in Nevada .....................  1177 
 D. In-Market vs. Out-of-Market Games .........................................  1180 
 E. The Existence of an Adequate Product Market in Southern 
Nevada ......................................................................................  1180 
 III. THE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL ANTITRUST EXEMPTION ................  1182 
 A. The Origins of the Major League Baseball Exemption and the 
Power of Stare Decisis ..............................................................  1182 
 B. Distinguishing the Sports Broadcasting Act Exemption from 
the Baseball Antitrust Exemption ..............................................  1184 
 C. Recent Criticisms and Legal Challenges to the Baseball 
Exemption .................................................................................  1185 
 IV. THE BASEBALL EXEMPTION AND NEVADA .......................................  1189 
 A. Revisiting Traditional Antitrust Analysis ..................................  1189 
 B. Applying Section 1 of the Sherman Act .....................................  1190 
 C. Consumer Protection Laws in Nevada ......................................  1191 
                                                        
*  Andrew Patrick Dunning, Esq., Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable Richard F. Scotti, 
Department II of the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. 
**  Kerry Elizabeth Kleiman, Esq., Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable Elissa F. Cadish, 
Department VI of the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. 
DUNNING - 16 NEV. L.J. 1171 - FINAL 6/20/2016  5:53 PM 
1172 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1171  
 D. Looking Away from Per Se Illegality and a “Quick Look” ......  1192 
 E. The Rule of Reason Absent the Baseball Exemption—
Analyzing the Circumstances Rather than Ignoring the 
Problem .....................................................................................  1193 
 F. Consumer Recourse ..................................................................  1196 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................  1198 
INTRODUCTION 
It is 4pm on a hot summer Saturday in Henderson, Nevada. Phil, an avid 
St. Louis Cardinals fan, settles down in front of his TV, ready to watch the 
game. He bought an “all-access” subscription from his cable provider, and paid 
more than $100 to ensure that he would be able to watch his beloved Cardinals. 
Phil scrolls through the guide, passing hundreds of other channels, until he 
reaches the large block of channels that read “Major League Baseball.” Imagine 
Phil’s surprise, and confusion, when he can’t find the Cardinals game.1 He 
double-checks their schedule, and indeed, the first pitch was to be thrown at 
4:05 p.m. PST. So why can’t Phil find the Cardinals game? Unfortunately for 
Phil, on this particular Saturday, the St. Louis Cardinals are playing the Los 
Angeles Dodgers. This means that Phil, despite his “all-access” subscription, 
will not be able to watch the Cardinals games this weekend. 
What Phil—like hundreds of other consumers in Nevada—didn’t realize, is 
that his “all-access” subscription only allows him to watch some of the baseball 
games that are scheduled for broadcast. What Phil didn’t realize is that his liv-
ing in Nevada has prevented him from watching certain teams’ games. Phil had 
no idea that he needed to have access to content provided to broadcasters by 
numerous regional sports networks to view all of the baseball games he ex-
pected to be included in his subscription. Instead of watching the Cardinals 
game as he had hoped, Phil will instead experience what many baseball fans 
have experienced: a sports broadcast “blackout.” 
Understandably, Phil may have assumed that all baseball games would be 
part of an “all-access” game subscription. What Phil did not realize was that 
Major League Baseball (MLB) teams retain exclusive broadcast rights within 
their home team territories, allowing them to control how consumers access 
broadcasts within that region. Nevada consumers like Phil may have assumed 
that all baseball games are “out-of-market” for Nevadans, or that they are not 
“home team” games. After all, Nevada is not the home to any MLB team. 
However, this assumption—although logical—is vastly different from the reali-
ty. If we are to refer to “in-market” teams as our “home teams” for the purposes 
of telecasting rights, then Major League Baseball has determined that Southern 
                                                        
1  Consumers like Phil may also experience a “blackout” by selecting the game, only to be 
greeted with the MLB’s “blackout message.” Blackouts FAQ, MLB.COM, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/help/faq_blackout.jsp [https://perma.cc/5GA8-RLYU] (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2016). 
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Nevada has six home teams: the Oakland Athletics, the San Francisco Giants, 
the San Diego Padres, the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim, the Arizona Dia-
mondbacks, and the Los Angeles Dodgers.2 By contrast, Northern Nevada has 
only two home teams: the Oakland Athletics and the San Francisco Giants. 
Similar to Southern Nevada, however, neither of these teams have any appar-
ent, demonstrated relation to Nevada.3 
This article will explore the impact that the high number of in-market 
games has on Nevadan consumers, and will primarily focus on Southern Neva-
da. Part I of this article will provide a curtailed overview on antitrust law. Part 
II will give a brief background and overview of the MLB telecasting rights,4 
and will also discuss who determines whether a team is in- or out-of-market. 
Part III of this article will discuss the long-standing “MLB Exemption,” which 
has kept the MLB outside of the reach of federal antitrust laws since 1922. Part 
III will also address recent legal challenges brought against the MLB and its 
antitrust exemption, and will address the analysis courts use when hearing these 
challenges. Part IV will look more specifically at Southern Nevada and will an-
alyze whether the MLB’s conduct invokes provisions of both Federal and Ne-
vada law by designating Southern Nevada as “home” to six baseball teams. Part 
IV will also look at the potential impact that the in- and out-of-market distinc-
tion has on Las Vegas consumers, and the recourse (or lack thereof) available 
to consumers who experience the blackout. Finally, this article will conclude by 
offering some suggestions for ways to limit or mitigate the burden that the 
MLB “Baseball Exemption” places on Nevadan consumers.5 
I. A BRIEF PRIMER ON ANTITRUST LAW: WHAT ARE ANTITRUST LAWS, AND 
WHY SHOULD WE CARE? 
If we were to oversimplify the scope and purpose of antitrust legislation, 
we could say that antitrust laws are meant to prevent anticompetitive business 
practices or unreasonable restrictions on competition that harm or undermine 
the free market of capitalism.6 Although the antitrust laws contained in Title 15, 
Chapter 1 of the United States Code are more nuanced than this brief descrip-
                                                        
2  Blackout, MLB.COM, http://www.mlb.com/mlb/subscriptions/blackout.jsp?postalCode=%2 
089120 [https://perma.cc/3VGA-5UCQ] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
3  Blackout, MLB.COM, http://www.mlb.com/mlb/subscriptions/blackout.jsp?postalCode=%2 
089523 [https://perma.cc/NZ7D-7SL5] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
4  Though this article is titled “Major League Broadcasting” as a tongue-in-cheek reference 
to its baseball content, the issue at hand is more properly referred to as “telecasting.” The 
terms “broadcasting” and “telecasting” will largely be used interchangeably throughout, re-
ferring predominantly to commercial television rights as opposed to other means of electron-
ic mass communication like internet or radio transferal. 
5  In the interest of simplicity, this article will refer to this as the “Baseball Exemption,” but 
capitalization of the term should not be construed as recognition of its applicability to any of 
the proposed analyses contained herein. 
6  See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012); Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 52–53 (2012); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
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tion implies, the overarching purpose of the Chapter is to prevent unreasonable 
restraints to trade.7 Antitrust laws benefit consumers and the market by prohib-
iting—and hopefully preventing—anticompetitive business practices, ultimate-
ly fostering an economy that encourages innovation, keeps service quality high, 
and pushes prices down.8 
Antitrust laws first originated in America in the 1890s, when Congress en-
acted the Sherman Antitrust Act.9 The Sherman Act prohibits companies from 
unreasonably restricting competition, and vests the Justice Department with au-
thority to seek redress from federal courts for Sherman Act violations.10 The 
Federal Trade Commission’s authority to take action against antitrust violators 
offers American consumers further protection against anticompetitive practic-
es.11 Indeed, by enacting the Sherman Act, “Congress ‘wanted to go to the ut-
most extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly 
agreements. . . .’ ”12 Without the protections offered by the Sherman Act and its 
progeny, corporations and conglomerates would have the capacity to consoli-
date power and fix product prices far above “fair market value.” In a society 
based upon a free market economy, the consequences of inadequate antitrust 
laws could be devastating. 
II. MAJOR LEAGUE BROADCASTING RIGHTS 
A.  “Home Television Territory” Organization for Major League 
Baseball 
The MLB imposes strict restrictions on television broadcasting rights of 
live sporting events. The MLB’s Constitution includes many provisions broad-
casting of different franchises and Clubs to the exception of others.13 Specifi-
cally, Article X, Section 3 of the MLB Constitution gives each Club exclusive 
contract rights to the live telecast of its home and away games, so long as those 
                                                        
7  See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7. 
8  See Anticompetitive Practices, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/enforce 
ment/anticompetitive-practices [https://perma.cc/T3BU-DHFQ] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
9  15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7. 
10  Id. § 4. 
11  See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012) (giving the FTC authority to use its administrative powers to 
enforce the Sherman Act); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Trading Stamp Co., 
405 U.S. 233 (1972) (stating that the FTC has authority to take action against a company’s 
“unfair” business practices, even if those practices don’t truly violate the Antitrust laws). 
12  Gulf Oil Corp. v Copp Paving Co., 419 US 186, 194 (1974) (quoting United States v. Se. 
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944)). 
13  MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. VIII, § 9, http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources 
/SportsEntLaw_Institute/League%20Constitutions%20&%20Bylaws/MLConsititutionJune2
005Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA4S-EX5R] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). In the interest of 
clarity and simplicity, due to the frequent use of the term “MLB” throughout this article, the 
authors will refer to the Major League Constitution—the governing document for Major 
League Baseball—as “the MLB Constitution.” 
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agreements are limited to the area of the Club’s “home television territory” 
(HTT).14 These exclusive rights apply to all regular-season home and away 
games.15 Notable exceptions to the HTT limitations are post-season and cham-
pionship games.16 Additional exceptions are games that ESPN elects to air it-
self, which are available to all consumers with access to an ESPN broadcast, 
and without regard to a given HTT.17  
Though the MLB’s limitation of broadcasting rights within HTTs is unam-
biguous, the actual boundaries of the territories remain unclear. Article VIII of 
the MLB Constitution provides, in part, that “the definitions of the home televi-
sion territories of the Major League Clubs shall be maintained in the Commis-
sioner’s Office.”18 Consequently, the actual boundaries of a Club’s HTT are not 
necessarily public knowledge.19 This is in contrast to a Club’s “operating terri-
tories,” which are clearly designated in the MLB Constitution, and are compar-
atively limited in geographic scope.20 With few deviations, a Club’s operating 
territory is confined to the county where the team is located, and those counties 
in the immediate vicinity.21  
Although the MLB Constitution does not determine the official areas of the 
HTT, and they are not otherwise publically available through the MLB, there 
are several approximated territory maps online that purport to depict the territo-
ries’ likely configuration.22 These maps have been generated through a number 
of investigative approaches, including through contacting broadcasters, Clubs, 
and through zip code search results performed on MLB.com—the most com-
mon way for consumers to determine which HTT (or HTTs) they fall within.23 
To market its all-inclusive television and online-viewing packages, the MLB 
website allows users to enter their zip code and find out which Club’s (or 
Clubs’) live games are blacked out given the residence at which the consumer 
will watch his or her game package.24 These resources, as of this writing, are 
                                                        
14  Id. art. X, § 3. 
15  Id. 
16  Id. § 4. 
17  Id. 
18  Id. art. VIII, § 9. 
19  Numerous outlets have, however, created maps that indicate rough boundaries for the 
broadcasting regions. See Nathaniel Grow, End the Blackouts, HARDBALL TIMES (Jan. 14, 
2015), http://www.hardballtimes.com/end-the-blackouts [https://perma.cc/2FRN-AA35]. 
These territorial maps, as discussed hereafter, have provided consumers exposure to market 
divisions that, pursuant to the MLB Constitution, would otherwise remain with the Commis-
sioner’s Office. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. VIII, § 9. Consumer transparency will be dis-
cussed at greater length infra. 
20  MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. VIII, § 8. 
21  Id. 
22  See Grow, supra note 19. 
23  See, e.g., id. 
24  Blackout Restrictions, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/subscriptions/index.jsp#black 
out [https://perma.cc/6UTB-GRT9] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
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the only way the average consumer can approximate the area of the HTT that 
controls available broadcasts.  
In addition to a glaring lack of transparency, another issue that arises when 
considering these maps is that the HTT broadcasting rights often extend signif-
icantly further than a Club’s ordinary operating territory and, in some circum-
stances, present significant overlaps among clubs.25 
B. Regional Sports Networks 
Because each MLB Club retains exclusive rights to contract with television 
networks, consumers within the boundaries of that HTT experience multiple 
limitations upon their access to the Club’s games. Consumers can generally on-
ly watch a team’s live games if they have access to the network that has con-
tracted to carry its games.26 Clubs have determined that the most profitable 
manner to exercise these exclusive rights is to offer their live game telecasts 
through the use of regional sports networks.27 The term “regional sports net-
work” (RSN) generally refers to a content-specific television station that offers 
live broadcasts of professional and college sports to a local or regional mar-
ket.28 The San Francisco Giants, for example, utilize Comcast Sports Net 
(CSN) Bay Area as their RSN; CSN governs the exclusive broadcasting rights 
to all San Francisco Giants games within the HTT.29 
After paying for the right to be the exclusive provider of a Club’s telecasts 
within its HTT, the RSN then negotiates with various satellite and cable pro-
viders within that HTT.30 These negotiations determine a viewer’s actual access 
to a Club’s games. Generally, if the RSN is unable to reach an agreement with 
                                                        
25  The most egregious of these overlaps appear to be in Iowa and Southern Nevada, both of 
which are claimed as HTTs of six MLB teams. See Erik Malinowski, WTF MLB? Baseball 
Strikes Out with Its Streaming Policies, ROLLINGSTONE (June 5, 2015), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/sports/features/wtf-mlb-baseball-strikes-out-with-its-streaming-
policies-20150605 [https://perma.cc/3DAL-R3JE]. However, it is perhaps the U.S. Territory 
of Guam that best highlights the ridiculousness of the MLB blackout policy. People in Guam 
cannot watch Oakland A’s or San Francisco Giants games because they are in the Northern 
California “home” territory, even though Guam is nearly 5800 miles away from the Bay Ar-
ea. Id. 
26  Blackout Restrictions, supra note 24. 
27  See Maury Brown, Through July, MLB Telecasts on Regional Sports Networks Dominate 
Prime Time TV, FORBES (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/20 
14/08/05/mlb-telecasts-on-regional-sports-networks-dominate-prime-time-television/#268c3 
bf12c24 [https://perma.cc/P39P-PSYS] (discussing Major League Baseball’s success in us-
ing regional sports networks, author Maury Brown noted that “[e]ach regional sports net-
work televises an average of 148 MLB game per season, most in prime time (7p–11p), when 
the television audience is the greatest and advertisers are looking to get the best bang for 
their buck.”). 
28  See George Foster et al., Determinants of Regional Sport Network Television Ratings in 
MLB, NBA, and NHL, 28 J. SPORT MGMT. 356, 357 (2014). 
29  See Giants Talk, COMCAST SPORTSNET BAY AREA, http://www.csnbayarea.com/giants 
[https://perma.cc/QC95-HJBW] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
30  See Foster supra note 28, at 358. 
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a provider, consumers within the Club’s HTT will be unable to watch the live 
game telecasts of that respective Club. As an added consequence of this black-
out, consumers have limited apparent recourse beyond making additional pur-
chases with a competing provider that carries that RSN. Further, it is not neces-
sarily apparent to consumers who, exactly, is to blame for game blackouts. 
This brings us back Phil, the St. Louis Cardinals’ fan, sitting on his couch 
wondering why he couldn’t watch his team. Part of Phil’s hypothetical problem 
was that his beloved Cardinals were playing the Los Angeles Dodgers. In 2014, 
the Dodgers made their own television channel—SportsNet LA—and signed an 
exclusive deal with Time Warner Cable (TWC), giving TWC the right to run 
and distribute SportsNet LA.31 For fourteen months, TWC essentially held 
Dodgers games hostage: TWC customers could watch Dodgers games on 
SportsNet LA, but TWC would not lower the per-home price for other distribu-
tors.32 Because of the stalemate between TWC and other cable providers, more 
than half of the Los Angeles market was precluded from watching Dodgers 
games in 2014.33 Luckily for many Dodgers fans, this impasse came to an end 
when Charter Communications began carrying SportsNet LA in mid-2015.34 
However, Phil remains unlucky because he lives in Las Vegas, and SportsNet 
LA continues to be unavailable to most Las Vegas consumers. 
C. Major League Baseball Broadcasting in Nevada 
Nevada is in an interesting situation when it comes to MLB Home Televi-
sion Territories and the corresponding RSNs. Pursuant to the MLB Constitu-
tion, a Club could have significant control over areas of Nevada, provided that 
those areas fell within that Club’s operating territory. Again, this territory 
                                                        
31  Mike Axisa, Dodgers Announce Deal with Time Warner, Launch of SportsNet LA, CBS 
SPORTS (Jan. 28, 2013, 11:38 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/eye-on-
baseball/21620862/dodgers-announce-deal-with-time-warner-launch-of-sportsnet-la 
[https://perma.cc/XS6T-NCWR]; see TIME WARNER CABLE SPORTSNET LA, http://watch.spo 
rtsnetla.com/?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sportsnetla.com%2F [https://perma.cc/5Y7B-
XLVE] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
32  Ed Sherman, As TV Battle Looms, Many Dodgers Fans Left in Dark, USA TODAY (Feb. 
26, 2014, 11:20 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2014/02/25/dodgers-
signed-a-mega-86-billion-pact-with-time-warner-cable/5819387 [https://perma.cc/KJJ9-
HQTQ] (“DirecTV, Verizon FiOS and AT&T U-Verse are among the carriers balking at 
charging their subscribers $4.50-$5 month per month to carry SportsNet LA. ESPN, by 
comparison, gets about $5.40 per home, TNT $1.20.”). 
33  Id. (“Time Warner’s 2 million cable subscribers in Los Angeles will get their Dodger 
baseball from the moment the channel launches. The remaining 55% of the market’s TV 
households are at the mercy of the network and their cable or satellite provider reaching an 
agreement.”). 
34  Meg James, Charter to Carry Dodgers Channel, SportsNet LA, Beginning Tuesday, L.A. 
TIMES (June 4, 2015, 5:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-
et-ct-charter-to-carry-dodger-channel-june-9-20150604-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZN9S-
A8QA]. However, it is worth noting that Charter only began carrying SportsNet LA once it 
decided to acquire TWC for approximately $57 billion; the other pay-TV operators still re-
fuse to pay the fees necessary to carry SportsNet LA. Id. 
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would generally be limited to the county where the Club is located, as well as 
immediately surrounding counties. The reality, however, is that Nevada is not 
home to any MLB Clubs. To be sure, no MLB Club has any physical home 
team presence in Nevada whatsoever, nor any apparent direct connection to 
Nevada consumers. Accordingly, no portion of Nevada falls within any Club’s 
operating territory to the same extent that Southern California, for example, is 
squarely within the Los Angeles Dodgers’ operating area. 
However, the geographic limits placed on a Club’s operating territory does 
not correlate with the boundaries of a Club’s HTT. For example, despite the 
obvious fact that no MLB club has a physical presence in Nevada, Northern 
Nevada falls within both Oakland’s and San Francisco’s HTT.35 Accordingly, 
California Bay Area teams (the San Francisco Giants and Oakland Athletics) 
have near complete control over the access to their games in a neighboring state 
that has no MLB presence of its own. 
The HTT situation in Southern Nevada is even more troubling. Las Vegas 
and the surrounding area falls within a significant overlap of six different MLB 
Clubs and their RSNs: The Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim (Fox Sports 
West),36 the San Francisco Giants (CSN Bay Area),37 the Oakland Athletics 
(CSN California),38 the Los Angeles Dodgers (SportsNet by Time Warner Ca-
ble Company),39 the San Diego Padres (Fox Sports San Diego),40 and the Ari-
zona Diamondbacks (Fox Sports Arizona).41 
The obvious question is why the boundaries of HTTs need to be exponen-
tially greater than the boundaries of a Club’s operating territory. The MLB 
Constitution offers no clear-cut answer, but the use of RSNs as the lynchpin in 
distributing live-game telecasts indicates that the MLB and its Clubs treat Ne-
vada consumers as leverage for negotiations. This is apparent from the fact that 
the larger the boundary of a Club’s HTT, the more consumers the RSN can 
claim to have control over when it negotiates with a cable or satellite provider. 
In this context, control over an HTT equates to control over recipients of adver-
tising, because sports fans are more likely to watch a game live than record it 
for later viewing.42 
                                                        
35  Grow, supra note 19. 
36  RSNs and Their Big League Rights, SPORTS BUS. J. 22 (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.sports 
businessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2014/03/17/In-Depth/RSN-chart.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/YQ86-KRB4]. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
42  Adam Buckman, Networks in the Hunt for DVR-Proof Non-Sports Programming, 
TVNEWSDAILY (June 22, 2015, 11:41 AM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/tele 
vision-news-daily/edition/2015/06/22/?print [https://perma.cc/YL6N-HEPB] (“Live sports 
comprise the most DVR-proof category of programming of them all, since the nature of 
sports is antithetical to the concept of time-shifted TV watching.”). 
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The consequence of this overlap appears to be a restraint on output; Neva-
da consumers have their broadcasting options limited by multiple competing 
Clubs that have no Nevada connection (beyond casual fans in that particular 
consumer base), all of which limit the Clubs’ home games to the RSN of their 
choice within their HTT. This means that because Las Vegas has been deemed 
a part of the Giants’ and the Diamondbacks’ HTT, consumers in Las Vegas 
would have to subscribe to CSN Bay Area and Fox Sports Arizona in order to 
watch these “in-market” games.43 In turn, the consumer’s ability to subscribe to 
either RSN depends on whether his or her provider (e.g., DirecTV or Cox Ca-
ble) has successfully negotiated for the right to offer that RSN to its customers. 
Though all of Nevada is subject to HTT division to some extent, this over-
lap creates the most disparate impact in Southern Nevada. Nevada consumers 
who pay for presumably exhaustive “season ticket”-style broadcast subscrip-
tions44 will be able to view all out-of-market games without issue. These same 
consumers, however, will experience a blackout for all in-market games, unless 
they subscribe to each of the in-market Clubs’ RSN broadcasting agreements.  
In theory, this requires a Southern Nevada consumer who has presumably 
paid for “all” MLB games to additionally purchase the telecast from each of the 
six overlapping clubs’ RSN agreements to actually ensure access to those 
games.45 Otherwise, all telecasts of the in-market games will be blacked out 
pursuant to the MLB broadcast policy and, consequently, remain generally un-
available to paying consumers.46 
                                                        
43  While this is generally true, the authors recognize that, in prior seasons, live telecasts of 
some Diamondbacks and Padres games have been available via simulcast to Cox Cable sub-
scribers on a “Cox Community Channel”, which is not an RSN. In the past, more Padres 
games than Diamondbacks games have been accessible in this manner. Currently, it is un-
known how the Cox Community Channel obtained simulcast rights to these games, and it’s 
unclear whether either the Diamondbacks or Padres will allow Cox Cable to continue offer-
ing any games via simulcast in the future. This limited exception appears to apply only to 
Padres and Diamondbacks games; we found no evidence that any Dodgers, Angels, Giants 
or Athletics games have ever been accessible in this manner in Southern Nevada. 
44  The most notable of these is the popular “MLB Extra Innings” package provided by Di-
recTV which, as its promotional materials denote, provides “almost 100 out-of-market 
games a week” to subscribers. MLB Extra Innings, DIRECTV, http://www.directv.com/spo 
rts/mlb [https://perma.cc/AP59-U64R] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
45  In the past, this would have required a consumer to keep abreast of which television pro-
viders held contracts with which RSNs and (potentially) purchase channel packages from 
multiple providers. However, the MLB has recently announced that it will begin offering 
single team subscriptions so that fans can watch a team’s entire season without blackouts. 
See Gershon Rabinowitz, Breaking Down MLB.TV’s Single Team Package, BASEBALL 
ESSENTIAL (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.baseballessential.com/news/2016/01/05/breaking-
down-mlb-tvs-single-team-package [https://perma.cc/3PKC-YVBE]. 
46  To date, only the in-market live game telecast was potentially available for any games 
involving an in-market team. Pursuant to a pending class action settlement discussed infra, 
consumers may now have the ability to watch the out-of-market team’s live telecast even 
when the opponent is an in-market team (e.g., the ability to watch the Yankees telecast of a 
Yankees-Giants matchup, rather than the Giants’ telecast). However, this option is condi-
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D. In-Market vs. Out-of-Market Games 
The HTTs’ impact on access to in-market games also restricts access to 
out-of-market games, which is often disappointing to consumers who invest in 
greater “season ticket”-style broadcasting subscriptions like the MLB’s own 
“MLB Extra Innings” package.47 The distinction between in-market and out-of-
market games is best understood by reference to a live game telecast of a spe-
cific MLB Club. 
For illustrative purposes, we will again discuss the San Francisco Giants. 
The Giants control the distribution of all live game telecasts of Giants games in 
Northern Nevada as an “in-market” game, as Northern Nevada falls within the 
Giants’ HTT.48 Accordingly, these games are only accessible in Northern Ne-
vada through the Giants’ RSN—CSN Bay Area. Northern Nevada, however, is 
outside of the designated HTT of the New York Yankees, so the telecast of all 
live Yankees games in Northern Nevada is generally considered “out-of-
market.” Because the Yankees do not have HTT control of Northern Nevada, 
consumers in that region have other options for viewing most Yankees games, 
including “season ticket”-style broadcast subscriptions. However, if the Yan-
kees play the Giants, a Yankees fan living in Northern Nevada won’t be able to 
view the live telecast of that game via the standard Extra Innings Package, be-
cause that game is considered an in-market game for the Giants. 
In sum, the HTTs impact access to nearly every regular-season game 
played by the six Clubs that claim Southern Nevada (and the two that claim 
Northern Nevada). Access to these “in-market” games is restricted to fans of 
those particular Clubs, but even fans of other Clubs have their access restricted 
to certain “out-of-market” games if the opponent happens to be one of the six 
Clubs claiming Southern Nevada.49 
E. The Existence of an Adequate Product Market in Southern Nevada 
In analyzing antitrust concerns posed by the HTTs present in Southern Ne-
vada, it is necessary to evaluate whether an adequate product market exists for 
antitrust purposes. The six MLB Clubs that claim Southern Nevada within their 
HTTs impact access to nearly of all those teams’ live games in Southern Neva-
da, excluding games aired on ESPN and post-season and championship 
games.50 Because those six Clubs are the only ones that claim Southern Neva-
                                                                                                                                
tioned on the consumer subscribing to the particular RSN that carries the in-market telecasts. 
See infra notes 94, 97. 
47  See MLB Extra Innings, supra note 44. 
48  Grow, supra note 19. 
49  Pursuant to a pending class action settlement, consumers may have more access to out-of-
market games going forward, but that expanded access will still be subject to the HTTs, re-
quiring that consumers subscribe to the RSN affiliated with an in-market team in order to 
enjoy the benefits of expanded access to out-of-market games. See infra notes 94, 97. 
50  See Maury Brown, 2009 Season Begins with MLB Blackout Policy Still a Bone of Conten-
tion, FOXSPORTS: THE BIZ OF BASEBALL (Mar. 26, 2009, 2:02 PM), 
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da, there is a compelling argument that the live game telecasts of those Clubs 
constitute a sufficient product market and geographic market in an antitrust 
analysis.51 The geographic region is comprised of a significant portion of 
Southern Nevada, including the entirety of Clark County and surrounding are-
as.52 The six Clubs that claim Southern Nevada exercise nearly complete con-
trol over all broadcasts of that type within that region. 
There is a risk, however, that a broader product market is available because 
the business generated by those Clubs alone constitutes merely 20 percent of all 
competing Clubs nationally.53 Narrowing the market analysis to games played 
by the respective clubs, the HTT restrictions impact roughly 40 percent of all 
games broadcast in Southern Nevada (i.e., any live games that involve any of 
the six Clubs).54 
As an alternative to considering all MLB-generated business as the relevant 
market, an argument can be made that there is a significant in-between market 
for live game telecasts involving Clubs competing within the National League 
West (NL West) and the American League West (AL West).55 All of the Clubs 
that claim Southern Nevada are among the 10 total teams within the NL West 
and the AL West. Defining the market according to these specific regional 
leagues, rather than MLB coverage nationally, better exemplifies the impact of 
the HTTs in the area: roughly 70 percent of league play in Southern Nevada is 
restricted by this HTT overlap, a significant increase from the broader 20 per-
cent estimation for nationwide competition.56 
There are merits to either product market definition, but the acceptance of 
the larger market serves to minimize the anticompetitive impact of the MLB’s 
broadcasting restrictions. It is important in this analysis to again acknowledge 
the fact that, despite the myriad broadcasting restrictions that impact Nevada 
consumers, all restrictions are created by Clubs that have no physical presence 
whatsoever in Nevada. This supports the more-narrow, “regional league” prod-




51  See generally Philip Nelson, Monopoly Power, Market Definition, and the Cellophane 
Fallacy, U. S. DEP’T JUSTICE (June 25, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/atr/monopoly-power-
market-definition-and-cellophane-fallacy [https://perma.cc/MA7B-CVE3]. 
52  See Grow, supra note 19. 
53  Of the 30 national MLB Clubs nationally, the six teams claiming the Southern Nevada 
region within their HTT represent 20 percent of the League’s teams. Id. 
54  There are 30 Major League Baseball teams (15 teams in the NL and 15 teams in the AL) 
and six teams claiming the region within their HTT (even in the smaller markets of the indi-
vidual leagues and regions, six teams hold telecasting rights due to RSN agreements). Major 
League Baseball Standings, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, http://www.si.com/mlb/standings?sea 
son=2016&grouping=conference [http://perma.cc/3F4K-JXG8] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
55  Id. 
56  See Wendy Thurm, MLB Strongly Defends Local Broadcast Territories in Court, 
FANGRAPHS (May 23, 2014), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/mlb-strongly-defends-local-
broadcast-territories-in-court [https://perma.cc/2FTA-BXDV]. 
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uct market analysis due to the fact that the overlapping HTT boundaries are a 
consequence of regional Clubs claiming areas beyond their accepted (and de-
fined) operating territories under the MLB Constitution. Because these en-
croaching HTT boundaries emanate from teams in the western region that are 
within either the NL West or the AL West, the product market ought to be de-
fined by live game telecasts within those leagues and the affected consumers of 
those games. 
III. THE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 
A. The Origins of the Major League Baseball Exemption and the Power 
of Stare Decisis 
Antitrust laws are a necessary and long-standing staple in American juris-
prudence. Congress first enacted the Sherman Act, the cornerstone of antitrust 
law, in 1890.57 The Sherman Act states, in relevant part, that “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal.”58 Antitrust laws are designed to protect the competitive 
nature of business in a capitalist system, thereby protecting consumers from 
exploitation.59 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that the Sherman Act was 
designed to be a “consumer welfare prescription,” and that “[any] restraint that 
has the effect of reducing the importance of consumer preference in setting 
price and output is not consistent with this fundamental goal of antitrust law.”60 
However, despite this emphasis on consumer welfare, the business of pro-
fessional baseball has long been exempted from scrutiny under antitrust law. 
This judicially-created exemption arose in 1922, when the United States Su-
preme Court decided Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League 
of Prof’l Baseball Clubs.61 In Federal Baseball, the Court held that commercial 
exhibition of baseball games were state events; because there was no interstate 
commerce involved in baseball game exhibitions in 1922, they were not subject 
to federal antitrust law at that time.62 
                                                        
57  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
58  Id. 
59  See Daniel A. Crane, Market Power Without Market Definition, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
31, 35 (2014) (“Today there is a wide consensus that the primary, if not exclusive, goal of 
antitrust law is to promote economic efficiency and consumer welfare by deterring firms 
from subverting the competitive process and thus deriving the power to reduce output, price 
above competitive levels, and stymie innovation.”). 
60  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 
(1984). 
61  Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 
208–09 (1922). 
62  Id. It is worth noting that the Federal Baseball opinion never uses the word “exemption;” 
the holding was based simply on the Court’s determination of whether the subject matter in-
volved interstate commerce. 
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Over the next fifty years, the Supreme Court upheld and clarified the Base-
ball Exemption through two subsequent decisions. When deciding Toolson v. 
New York Yankees, the first case to invoke the Baseball Exemption, the Court 
further insulated the professional baseball industry from federal antitrust liabil-
ity because, at the time, major league baseball had “been left for thirty years to 
develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legis-
lation.”63 Later, in Flood v. Kuhn, the Court acknowledged that the Baseball 
Exemption is an “aberration” but again upheld the protection on the basis of 
stare decisis: 
Even though others might regard this as “unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogi-
cal,” the aberration is an established one, and one that has been recognized not 
only in Federal Baseball and Toolson, but in Shubert, International Boxing, and 
Radovich, as well, a total of five consecutive cases in this Court. It is an aberra-
tion that has been with us now for half a century, one heretofore deemed fully 
entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one that has survived the Court’s ex-
panding concept of interstate commerce. It rests on a recognition and an ac-
ceptance of baseball’s unique characteristics and needs.64 
In its reasoning, the Flood Court was careful to distinguish baseball from 
other sports industries when it noted that “[o]ther professional sports operating 
interstate—football, boxing, basketball, and, presumably, hockey and golf—are 
not so exempt.”65 The Court reasoned that Congress wanted the Baseball Ex-
emption to endure, because Congress had not amended the Sherman Act to ex-
pressly include Major League Baseball after the decision in Federal Baseball.66 
Therefore, the Flood Court opined that if Major League Baseball is ever to be 
subject to the provisions of federal antitrust law, it would have to be through 
express legislative action.67 
When looked at in a vacuum, the Court’s decision in Flood solidly stands 
on the grounds of separation of powers. The Sherman Act has been amended 
numerous times since the Federal Baseball decision, and Congress has not sub-
sequently sought to legislatively undo or clarify the Baseball Exemption.68 
However, the continued existence of the Baseball Exemption seems to disre-
gard the vast differences between modern Major League Baseball and the MLB 
of the 1920s. In 1922, the Court had to consider whether the Sherman Act ap-
plied to baseball exhibitions in which the only interstate actions were transport-
ing players from one stadium to another.69 Under those circumstances, it was 
                                                        
63  Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 356 (1953). 
64  Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (citation omitted) (quoting Radovich v. Nat’l 
Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957)). 
65  Id. at 282–83. 
66  Id. at 283. 
67  Id. 
68  15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
69  Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 
208–09 (1922). 
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reasonable for the Court to hold that the business of baseball was purely intra-
state.70 
However, in 1972—fifty years after Federal Baseball—the Flood Court 
realized, and stated unequivocally, that “professional baseball is a business . . . 
engaged in interstate commerce.”71 Because of this, the endurance of the Base-
ball Exemption rests on Major League Baseball’s reliance on its existence72 and 
the presumption that subjecting the MLB to antitrust laws now—after letting it 
develop for nearly 100 years under the assumption that it was exempt from an-
titrust regulation—would be inherently unfair.73 
B. Distinguishing the Sports Broadcasting Act Exemption from the 
Baseball Antitrust Exemption 
Though Congress has not yet chosen to legislatively reverse or narrow the 
longstanding Baseball Exemption, it has defined specific exemptions with re-
gard to broadcasting activities. In 1961, Congress passed the Sports Broadcast-
ing Act,74 which created a particularized exemption to the antitrust laws as ap-
plied to the televising of sporting events. 
The Sports Broadcasting Act created an exemption that allows professional 
sports teams that “sells or otherwise transfers” their rights in sponsored tele-
casting of games uninhibited by antitrust law.75 Section 1292, however, limits 
this exemption by providing that the person to whom such rights are sold or 
transferred cannot be prohibited from televising the games within any area.76 
As a caveat to this limitation, § 1292 also preserves each team’s right to impose 
restrictions on the telecasting of games “within the home territory of a member 
club of the league on a day when such club is playing a game at home.”77 
Importantly, the antitrust exemption provided by § 1291 applies only to 
“sponsored telecasting” of a team’s games and is inapplicable to non-sponsored 
telecasting.78 As the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
California noted, the term “sponsored telecasting” refers to over-the-air (free 
                                                        
70  It may be worth noting that the first radio broadcast of a major league baseball game oc-
curred on August 5, 1921, less than one year before Federal Baseball was argued and decid-
ed. Christopher H. Sterling, Radio Broadcasting, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/radio/Juvenile-action-and-adventure-series#ref1123774 
[https://perma.cc/X9MB-V84T]. It may further be worth noting that this original 1921 
broadcast was of a game between two Pennsylvania teams. Id. 
71  Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. 
72  Brent Kendall, Major League Baseball Scores Victory at Supreme Court, WALL STREET J. 
(Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/major-league-baseball-scores-victory-in-
supreme-court-ruling-1444054214. 
73  See Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953). 
74  15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–95. 
75  Id. § 1291. 
76  Id. § 1292. 
77  Id. 
78  Kingray v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 188 F. Supp.2d 1177, 1183 (S.D. Cal. 2002). 
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broadcasting), and non-sponsored telecasting refers to national cable (pay) 
broadcasting.79 Similarly, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York also relied on this distinction in Laumann v. National Hockey 
League, which held that the antitrust exemption provided by § 1291 did not ap-
ply to the telecasting of out-of-market games.80 
In sum, the exemption provided by the Sports Broadcasting Act does not 
extend to channels of distribution such as cable television, pay-per-view, and 
satellite television networks.81 In order to watch the games of the six Clubs that 
claim Southern Nevada as a home TV territory, Nevada consumers must sub-
scribe to one of the affiliated RSNs, all of which are non-sponsored forms of 
telecasting. 
Accordingly, the Sports Broadcasting Act exemption is inapplicable to the 
broadcasting of MLB clubs via RSNs, and antitrust concerns raised by MLB 
broadcasting activities rest strictly within the purview of the preexisting Base-
ball Exemption.82 Similar to the exemption provided by the Sports Broadcast-
ing Act, however, the Baseball Exemption has not developed without challeng-
es along the way. 
C. Recent Criticisms and Legal Challenges to the Baseball Exemption 
The history of the Baseball Exemption has garnered significant criticism 
from the legal community and has been the subject of more recent limitations 
to its scope. Notably, in 1982, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas acknowledged, in Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston 
Sports Ass’n, that the baseball antitrust exemption has little place in modernity 
beyond the principle of stare decisis.83 The court acknowledged the longstand-
ing presumption against exemptions to the antitrust laws, as well as the height-
ened burden placed upon defendants to prove that their actions are actually ex-
empted from those laws.84  
The court also observed that other courts had limited the Baseball Exemp-
tion as applicable only to those aspects of baseball that are integral to the sport, 
and that it does not extend to “related activities which merely enhance its 
commercial success.”85 The Houston Sports court further noted that the Su-
preme Court, in creating the Baseball Exemption, implied that broadcasting ac-
tivities are “not central enough to baseball to be encompassed in the baseball 
                                                        
79  Id. 
80  Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
81  15 U.S.C. §§ 1292–95. 
82  See Wendy Thurm, MLB Strongly Defends Local Broadcast Territories in Court, 
FANGRAPHS (May 23, 2014), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/mlb-strongly-defends-local-
broadcast-territories-in-court [https://perma.cc/5RS4-ZTUR]. 
83  Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 267 (S.D. Tex. 
1982). 
84  Id. at 265. 
85  Id. 
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exemption.”86 This 1982 approach to broadcasting, despite pertaining specifi-
cally to radio broadcasts, is particularly instructive when it comes to evaluating 
the current state of MLB television broadcasting restrictions.  
In addition to the Houston Sports court’s perceived limitations to the scope 
of the Baseball Exemption, more contemporary precedent supports the inap-
plicability of the Baseball Exemption to live game telecasts. For example, the 
United States Supreme Court addressed the distinction between the NFL and its 
aggregate teams in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League.87 In 
that case, the Court held that the numerous teams comprising the NFL should 
not be treated as a single entity for purposes of claims under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act with regards to marketing of the teams’ individually owned intel-
lectual property.88 Although the opinion did not address the historical exemp-
tion of baseball from the antitrust laws, legal scholars have already concluded 
that the American Needle holding indicates an increased willingness by the Su-
preme Court to both subject sports leagues to antitrust inquiry and to analyze 
their actions under the rule of reason test.89 
Under traditional antitrust analysis,90 the “rule of reason” test is used to de-
termine whether the allegedly anticompetitive behavior unreasonably restrains 
trade.91 Unlike actions that are considered to be illegal per se,92 courts analyze 
actions under the rule of reason based upon totality of the circumstances.93 The 
American Needle court’s decision to apply the rule of reason test to sports 
leagues’ activity indicates that a fact-dependent analysis of the overall anti-
competitive effect of commercial activities may eventually supplant the histori-
cal exemption to antitrust inquiry.  
Perhaps more importantly, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York relied on the holding in American Needle when conclud-
ing that “[t]he fact that the NHL and MLB are lawful joint ventures does not 
preclude plaintiffs from challenging the Leagues’ particular policies under the 
rule of reason.”94 In so ruling, the court extended the American Needle holding 
                                                        
86  Id. at 265, 267. 
87  560 U.S. 183, 186 (2010). 
88  Id. 
89  Michael J. Mozes & Ben Glicksman, Adjusting the Stream? Analyzing Major League 
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption After American Needle, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 265, 
290 (2011). 
90  See infra Part IV. 
91  See infra Part IV. 
92  See infra Part IV. 
93  See infra Part IV. 
94  Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Note that 
the Laumann case was filed as Case No. 1:12-cv-01817-SAS in the Southern District of New 
York. A separate class action, Garber vs. MLB, was filed as Case No. 1:12-cv-03704-SAS in 
the Southern District of New York. The two cases were later consolidated, with court opin-
ions pertaining to both issued under the Laumann case name (as cited throughout). The 
Laumann class plaintiffs reached a settlement with the NHL in 2015, while the Garber class 
plaintiffs continued litigation until their recent settlement with MLB. See infra note 97. 
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to include the live telecast markets in professional baseball and professional 
hockey.95 NHL live game telecasts were also the subject of the court’s analysis, 
and the court importantly drew parallels between the NHL and the MLB, par-
ticularly with regard to their respective telecasting arrangements.96 This com-
parison served to acknowledge how similarly situated these sports leagues are 
in the market, and raised further questions about the applicability of the Base-
ball Exemption to the benefit of one league—and one sport—over another.  
Recently, a class of plaintiffs sued the MLB and affiliated sports broad-
casters in Garber v. MLB, raising factual and legal allegations that are parallel 
to the circumstances in Southern Nevada.97 In the Garber case, two classes of 
plaintiffs alleged that, due to the HTTs, they were subjected to unreasonably 
high prices and an unreasonable number of “blacked out” games.98 The most 
                                                        
95  Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 486. 
96  Id. at 488. 
97  Class Action Complaint at 2–8, Laumann, 907 F.Supp.2d 465 (2012) (No. 12 Civ 3704 
(SAS)); Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 471. It is important to note that, as of the time of this 
writing, MLB and the Garber class plaintiffs have filed a proposed class action settlement 
agreement, and a fairness hearing is currently scheduled for April 25, 2016 for the court’s 
approval. The proposed settlement terms provide various degrees of relief for the plaintiff 
classes. First, the settlement will allow, but not require, Comcast and DirecTV to offer single 
team television packages alongside a league-wide “MLB Extra Innings”-type package at a 
discounted rate. Second, MLB.tv, Comcast, and DirecTV will provide an add-on option for 
subscribers to a league-wide package that allows users to “Follow Your Team” and view all 
telecasts of a specific out-of-market club, similar to the television option. Yet, both the sin-
gle-team and “Follow Your Team” options are subject to the HTTs and exclusive rights of 
in-market Clubs; i.e., the full benefit of either option can only be realized by also subscribing 
to the RSN of the respective in-market team(s). Class Action Settlement Agreement, Garber 
v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 120 F. Supp. 3d 334 (2014) (No. 12 Civ 3704 (SAS)) 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan 20, 2016) (identifying settlement terms between the Garber plaintiffs and de-
fendants in the Laumann case, as proposed for court approval). 
Third (in more limited circumstances) consumers who do not have access to pertinent 
distributors (part of a market of “Unserved Fans”) will have the option to purchase in-market 
telecasts via MLB.tv without having to subscribe to an unavailable intermediary RSN, sub-
ject to MLB verifying that such consumer truly has no available access to a distributor. 
Fourth, the proposed settlement identifies MLB price relief for MLB.tv and MLB Extra In-
nings packages for standard out-of-market games with limitations on price increases in up-
coming years. It is worth noting that, though numerous proposed provisions are geared to the 
internet plaintiffs, some consumers may have equivalent cable recourse through television 
streaming devices like Roku, Apple TV, proprietary “smart TV” software, and other inter-
net-to-television options. Id. 
The settlement provisions, however, are subject to certain limitations. Notably, the du-
ration of the relief offered is limited to only five years beginning with either the 2016 or 
2017 baseball season (depending on the particular settlement term). Additionally, not all 
teams’ telecasts are covered by the settlement; only a portion of RSNs are owned by the De-
fendants to whom the terms apply. Arguably most importantly, however, the HTT scheme 
that underpinned the Garber case and posture the Southern Nevada in-market overlap re-
mains untouched. The existence and scope of the HTT boundaries and the consequent black-
outs will continue, presumably allowing RSNs to retain their local bargaining power 
throughout the settlement period and after its duration. Id. 
98  Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 474. 
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analogous class is comprised of consumers who purchased cable packages 
through television providers like Comcast and DirecTV with the expectation of 
watching live baseball game broadcasts.99 Plaintiffs allege, and other observers 
agree,100 that the MLB’s ability to enter into exclusive contracts with television 
networks pressures consumers into purchasing both cable subscriptions and 
out-of-market cable packages to account for the blackout. The result is a func-
tional “double-dipping” by the League due to their elimination of competition 
amongst broadcasters,101 and an apparent restraint of trade.  
Even more recently, the Laumann court explicitly rejected the MLB’s ar-
gument that the historical Baseball Exemption should apply to live game tele-
casts.102 In support of its decision to patently reject the applicability of the nine-
ty-two-year-old Baseball Exemption, the court noted a prior instance in which 
the scope of the Baseball Exemption was narrowed: “[i]n 1998, Congress 
passed the Curt Flood Act, which effectively removed employment-related 
agreements from the baseball exemption. The Act did not alter the applicability 
of the antitrust laws to ‘any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements other than 
. . . employment of major league baseball players.’ ”103 
Simply put, courts seem less content than ever to resign rule of reason 
analyses to the principle of stare decisis alone. These recent decisions may 
provide a solid foundation for future challenges to the Baseball Exemption.104  
                                                        
99  Id.; Nathan M. Hennagin, Blackout or Blackmail? How Garber v. MLB Will Shed Light 
on Major League Baseball’s Broadcasting Cartel, 8 BROOK. J. CORP,. FIN. & COM. L. 158, 
175 (2013). 
100  See Hennagin, supra note 99, at 159 (arguing in 2013 that the Garber plaintiffs should 
prevail against the MLB in the Southern District of New York notwithstanding the Baseball 
Exemption); see also Jeff Passan, TV Blackouts Case Against MLB at Critical Point, 
YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 21, 2012, 1:41 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/tv-blackout-
case-against-mlb-at-critical-point.html [https://perma.cc/RVL9-L5ND]. In that article, sports 
journalist Jeff Passan opined that, upon the filing of the Garber complaint, the case repre-
sented “the workaround code for the working person.” Id. (claiming that Garber “[was] the 
suit behind which every baseball fan should stand. It’s 2012, where everything is available 
everywhere, and pure greed is keeping baseball off our TVs, our tablets, our laptops and our 
phones. If baseball refuses to budge on an issue so archaic, so absurd and so blatant in its 
indifference toward people who want to buy one of their products, the league should suffer 
through the embarrassment of getting clowned by the fans whom it clowns with black TV 
screens. It may move slowly—most antitrust lawsuits do—but if this succeeds, it will be a 
decades-forward leap in one fell swoop.”). As discussed supra, the proposed settlement in 
the Laumann case (with which the Garber claims were consolidated), indicated incremental 
change and a potential step in the right direction, just not necessarily the “decades-forward 
leap” that proponents hoped for. In the meantime, the Southern Nevada HTT overlap re-
mains untouched, albeit illuminated. 
101  Hennagin, supra note 99, at 175. 
102  Garber v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 12 Civ. 3704 (SAS), 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 133743, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2014) (denying MLB’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment and holding that the exemption is inapplicable to broadcasting activities). 
103  Id. at *3 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)). 
104  Eriq Gardner, Judge Rules MLB’s Antitrust Exemption Doesn’t Apply to Television 
Broadcast Rights, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 9, 2014, 9:04 AM) 
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IV. THE BASEBALL EXEMPTION AND NEVADA 
A. Revisiting Traditional Antitrust Analysis 
The Clayton Act permits private parties to institute actions under the feder-
al antitrust laws for damages and injunctive relief.105 However, a private plain-
tiff only has standing to enforce Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act if he or 
she suffered antitrust injury and is a proper party to bring suit.106 In making this 
determination, a court must “evaluate the plaintiff’s harm, the alleged wrongdo-
ing by the defendants, and the relationship between them.”107  
More than thirty years ago, the Supreme Court laid out a five-factor test to 
determine whether a plaintiff had proper standing to invoke the protection of 
the antitrust laws.108 First, a plaintiff must show that his alleged injury is “of the 
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which 
makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”109 
However, suffering an antitrust injury alone not necessarily sufficient for a 
plaintiff to have standing.110 Once a plaintiff has cleared that initial hurdle, he 
must then show that he is a proper plaintiff in light of four “efficient enforcer” 
factors:  
(1) ‘the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury;’ (2) ‘the existence of an 
identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them 
to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement;’ (3) the speculativeness 
of the alleged injury; and (4) the difficulty of identifying damages and appor-
tioning them among direct and indirect victims so as to avoid duplicative recov-
eries.111 
                                                                                                                                
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/judge-rules-mlbs-antitrust-exemption-724368 
[https://perma.cc/F2SE-WJGT]. 
105  15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27. 
106  15 U.S.C. § 15; see also Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois , 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977) (holding that 
indirect purchasers do not have standing to sue for antitrust injuries). 
107  Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 
519, 535 (1983). Section 4 of the Clayton Act broadly defines who may maintain a private 
action for treble damages under the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 15. Although a prospective 
private plaintiff may be able to evidence that it suffered an antitrust injury and is entitled to 
injunctive relief, additional factors must be met for the plaintiff to have standing to pursue 
treble damages.  
108   
109  Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
110  Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 nn. 5–6 (1986) (“[A] showing 
of antitrust injury is necessary, but not always sufficient.”). 
111  Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men’s Int’l Prof’l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 
1988). The Ninth Circuit has similarly held that the court must weigh five factors when con-
sidering standing: “(1) the nature of the plaintiff’s alleged injury; that is, whether it was the 
type the antitrust laws were intended to forestall; (2) the directness of the injury; (3) the 
speculative measure of harm; (4) the risk of duplicative recovery; and (5) the complexity in 
apportioning damages.” Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. Co., 190 F.3d 1051, 1054–55 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
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These factors only determine whether a plaintiff’s claim will be heard. Ac-
tually succeeding on the merits, however, is an entirely different hurdle. 
B. Applying Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
As discussed above, section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States.”112 The Supreme Court has 
clarified that Section 1 “outlaw[s] only unreasonable restraints.”113 To establish 
a Section 1 violation, a plaintiff must allege (1) “ ‘a combination or some form 
of concerted action between at least two legally distinct economic entities’ that 
(2) ‘constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade either per se or under the rule 
of reason.’ ”114 
Certain agreements that courts, after “considerable experience with the 
type of restraint at issue,” determine to have “manifestly anti-competitive ef-
fects . . . and lack . . . any redeeming virtue,” are deemed per se violations of 
the Sherman Act.115 Such Sherman Act violations are considered to be “neces-
sarily illegal.”116 However, if an alleged trade restraint falls outside this “neces-
sarily illegal” category, “[t]he rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing 
whether a practice restrains trade in violation of § 1.”117 “The rule [of reason] 
distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to 
the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s 
best interest.”118 A court must “determine whether the . . . restriction is a naked 
restraint on trade, and thus invalid, or one that is ancillary to the legitimate and 
competitive purposes of the business association and thus valid.”119 
The Supreme Court adopted the following burden-shifting approach for the 
rule of reason: 
[P]laintiffs bear an initial burden to demonstrate the defendants’ challenged be-
havior had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant 
market . . . . [E]vidence that plaintiffs have been harmed as individual competi-
tors will not suffice. . . . If the plaintiffs satisfy their initial burden, the burden 
shifts to the defendants to offer evidence of the pro-competitive effects of their 
                                                        
112  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
113  Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (empha-
sis in original); see 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
114  Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2000) (quot-
ing Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 542 (2d Cir. 
1993)). 
115  Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). Categorizing a restraint as per se illegal “eliminates the 
need to study the reasonableness of an individual restraint in light of the real market forces at 
work.” Id. 
116  Id. at 886–87. 
117  Id. at 885. 
118  Id. 
119  Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 (2006). 
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agreement . . . . Assuming defendants can provide such proof, the burden shifts 
back to the plaintiffs to prove that any legitimate competitive benefits offered by 
defendants could have been achieved through less restrictive means.120 
Finally, as an alternative to “per se” and “rule of reason” analyses, certain 
challenged practices warrant an “abbreviated or quick-look rule of reason anal-
ysis.”121 This “quick-look” analysis occurs in situations when a more thorough 
review is unwarranted “because the great likelihood of anticompetitive effects 
can be easily ascertained”122 or in situations where the “restraints on competi-
tion are essential if the product is to be available at all . . . [therefore] the 
agreement is likely to survive the Rule of Reason.”123 The “quick-look” analy-
sis has been summarized as one that is applicable if 
“an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could con-
clude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on 
customers and markets.”. . .  It is not appropriate, however, where the anticom-
petitive effects of an agreement are not obvious or [the agreement] may “have a 
net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on competition.”124 
C. Consumer Protection Laws in Nevada 
Nevada provided many consumer protections through its enactment of the 
Nevada Unfair Trade Practices Act (NUTPA), which largely echoes, and is 
read in concert with, federal antitrust law.125 Nevada Revised Statute section 
598A.060(1)(b) prohibits division of markets, inclusive of agreements between 
competitors to divide territories.126 Additionally, NRS section 598A.060(1)(c) 
prohibits allocation of customers, including agreements between competitors 
not to sell to specified customers of a competitor.127  
                                                        
120  Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc. (Salvino II), 542 F.3d 290, 317 (2nd 
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). In making this determination “the factfinder weighs 
all of the circumstances of a case” including “specific information about the relevant busi-
ness . . . the restraint’s history, nature, and effect . . . and [w]hether the businesses involved 
have market power.” Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886–87 (citations omitted). 
121  Salvino (Salvino II), 542 F.3d at 317. 
122  Id. The Supreme Court found an abbreviated analysis appropriate where a plan expressly 
limited the number of college football games that could be televised and fixed a minimum 
price for those games. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 106–10 (1984) (holding that no “detailed market analysis” was necessary 
to find that the NCAA’s television broadcasting plan placed a facial restraint on trade that 
had the effect of “utterly destroy[ing] free market competition.”). 
123  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010) (noting that the 
Rule of Reason “can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye” and that certain “fea-
tures of the NFL may save agreements amongst the teams . . . for example . . . the interest in 
maintaining a competitive balance”) (citations omitted). 
124  Major League Baseball Props., Inc v. Salvino Inc. (Salvino I), 420 F.Supp.2d 212, 220 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770–71 (1999)). 
125  Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A (2010), with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012), and 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 12–27 (2012). 
126  NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.060(1)(b) (2010). 
127  NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.060(1)(c) (2010). 
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The MLB Constitution,128 with its aforementioned provisions concerning 
HTTs, is functionally an agreement among the MLB and competing MLB 
Clubs, and the designation of HTTs is a division of both markets and the con-
sumers residing within them.129 It would appear as though, by these divisions, 
the MLB and the RSNs are violating NUTPA. This market allocation seeming-
ly supports a conspiracy claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act as well, 
though such claims are impractical to bring and are rarely pursued.130  
As addressed in the Introduction, this Article seeks to identify an issue that 
disproportionately impacts Nevadans, and to gauge whether an analysis under 
the rule of reason would empower a court—state or federal—to find the MLB’s 
activity violative of the antitrust laws. Though there is no obvious answer or 
solution; there are only potentially anticompetitive issues related to MLB tele-
casting in Nevada. The legality of these issues, however, is dependent on a va-
riety of factors including, as discussed above, the election of the proper analy-
sis, the definition of the relevant product market, and the indication of the 
specific injury to competition necessitating the application of antitrust law.  
D. Looking Away from Per Se Illegality and a “Quick Look” 
Courts have traditionally viewed certain actions, including horizontal cus-
tomer allocation and horizontal territorial allocation, to be illegal per se.131 
However, the per se rule does not necessarily apply when the alleged conduct is 
taken by professional, or organized amateur, sports leagues. As discussed 
above, courts have increasingly recognized that the business of organized 
sports leagues encompasses industries in which some horizontal restraints on 
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.132 Furthermore, 
courts’ hesitation to apply the per se analysis absent “considerable experience” 
with that particular type of restraint renders per se illegality inappropriate when 
applied to a somewhat novel broadcasting discussion.133 
By contrast, the “quick look” analysis, which is employed as a truncated 
rule of reason analysis, is likely inapplicable to MLB telecasting arrangements. 
A number of courts have found the “quick look” analysis to be inapplicable to 
                                                        
128  MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. VIII, § 9, 
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_Institute/League%20Constitutions
%20&%20Bylaws/MLConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA4S-EX5R ] 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
129   See Id. arts. III, IX. 
130  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
131  See OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP’T. JUSTICE,  U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANTITRUST 
RESOURCE MANUAL § 8, http://www.justice.gov/usam/antitrust-resource-manual-8-identify 
ing-sherman-act-violations [https://perma.cc/JU47-73S6] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
132  Am. Needle, Inc., v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 202–04 (2010) (holding that, 
“[w]hen ‘restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all,’ per se 
rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint must be judged according to the 
flexible Rule of Reason”). 
133  See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887 (2007). 
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the business of organized sports leagues because, in the language of the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Major League Baseball Prop., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 
“the casual observer could not summarily conclude” that the arrangements in 
question had an anticompetitive effect on customers.134 The telecasting discus-
sion at issue, despite having received a less-than-positive reaction from the me-
dia and consumers alike, is not apparently anticompetitive to the extent that the 
“quick look” analysis is applicable.135 It does not appear that there has been 
sufficient legal development on the telecasting issue or information on the anti-
competitive impact of these broadcasting restrictions to relegate the antitrust 
analysis to a mere “casual observ[ation].”136 
As discussed above, since 1984 the “rule of reason” analysis has been ap-
plied with greater frequency to gauge the anticompetitive nature of business ac-
tivities in professional organized sports.137 With that in mind, and given the de-
velopments in the Laumann v. National Hockey League case, this discussion is 
best addressed within the context of the “rule of reason.”138 Even so, employing 
the rule of reason rather than a per se analysis does not change the ultimate fo-
cus of a court’s inquiry; in both cases, the construct is applied “to form a judg-
ment about the competitive significance of the restraint”139 
E. The Rule of Reason Absent the Baseball Exemption—Analyzing the 
Circumstances Rather than Ignoring the Problem 
If presented with a legal challenge from Southern Nevada consumer plain-
tiffs, a court could, consistent with the Supreme Court’s perspective on orga-
nized professional and collegiate sports leagues as stated in American Needle140 
and NCAA,141 apply the rule of reason test and reexamine broadcasting with a 
critical eye toward the Baseball Exemption.142 In Laumann, the Southern Dis-
trict of New York repeatedly acknowledged the appropriate application of the 
rule of reason in the context of live game telecasts.143 The court indicated that 
                                                        
134   542 F.3d 290, 307 (2008). 
135  Gardner, supra note 104. 
136  Salvino (Salvino II), 542 F.3d at 307. 
137  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 
(1984). 
138  Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
139  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 103 (1984) (citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l 
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)). 
140  See generally American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
141  See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. 85. 
142  See generally American Needle, 560 U.S. 183. 
143  Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 485, 488. In denying the MLB’s Motion to Dismiss, the 
Court was critical of the MLB’s “legitimate joint ventures” argument, in which defendants 
argues that “the production and distribution of live telecasts of games—is ‘core activity’ 
immune from antitrust scrutiny.” Id. at 488. The court explained that “the notion that ‘the 
exhibition of [ ] league games on television and the Internet’ is clearly a ‘league issue’ is 
contrary to longstanding precedent that agreements limiting the telecasting of professional 
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inherently anticompetitive broadcasting agreements, even those that are essen-
tial for the product to be available at all, do not warrant blanket immunity from 
antitrust scrutiny.144  
A United States District Court could, for example, analyze issues similar to 
those presented in Garber,145 with an eye toward the disproportionate impact of 
the HTT overlap as it pertains to the Southern Nevada market. Pursuant to 
NCAA and consistent with the Laumann146 court’s analysis, the court could ex-
amine whether MLB inter-club contracting with RSNs within their respective 
HTTs presents a horizontal restraint on competition147 and market allocation 
that is violative of antitrust law.  
The court would be able to examine what justifications exist for the origin 
and broad scope of the HTTs. The court could further evaluate whether the es-
tablishment of HTTs, and the resulting exclusive agreements between MLB 
Clubs and their RSNs that allow RSNs to sell telecasting rights to distributors, 
restricts competition amongst RSNs for live game telecasts, the entry of new 
RSNs and alternative intermediaries for broadcast right distribution, and com-
petition between Clubs for viewership in a given territory. The court would 
have an opportunity to analyze the reality that, in order to access additional 
programming, the end consumer has to “buy in” to an RSN’s regional monopo-
ly by purchasing broadcasting packages with another in-market distributor 
and/or out-of-market game packages. The court could additionally analyze the 
consequences of these agreements, including price impacts on the end consum-
er and potential “double-dipping,”148 as they pertain to the six-Club HTT over-
lap in Southern Nevada.  
Southern Nevada consumers could argue that the MLB-HTT arrangements 
arbitrarily create artificial demand for a product, and that the price for the prod-
uct (i.e., the price to subscribe to an RSN) is based on manufactured demand 
rather than actual demand. Consumers can further emphasize how the HTTs 
require consumers to pursue broadcasting from numerous distributors, or 
switch from one distributor to another, for access to live games because six 
clubs have exclusive broadcasting authority within the region. Consumers 
                                                                                                                                
sports games are subject to antitrust scrutiny, and analyzed under the rule of reason.” Id. The 
court noted that, “[e]ven if certain agreements by sports leagues with respect to telecasting 
games may be ‘essential if the product is to be available at all’ this does not give league 
agreements regarding television rights blanket immunity from antitrust scrutiny.” Id. 
144  Id. at 488. 
145  See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. 85. 
146  See generally Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465. 
147  Many courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have recognized that “a horizontal agreement 
that allocates a market between competitors and ‘restrict[s] each company’s ability to com-
pete for the other’s [business]’ may injure competition.” Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 
675 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2012). 
148  The consequences of which, as alleged by the Laumann Plaintiffs, are reduced output, 
raising prices, and rendering output as “unresponsive to consumer preference to view live 
. . . games, including local games, through both internet and television media.” Laumann, 
907 F. Supp. 2d at 475. 
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could also argue that the agreements allow RSNs and their affiliated Clubs to 
charge supracompetitive prices due to the RSNs’ exclusive control of in-market 
broadcasts. Additionally, consumers could pursue an “output control” theory as 
did the Laumann149 plaintiffs, arguing that clubs are unreasonably restricted 
from telecasting their out-of-market games beyond their MLB-drawn territory, 
irrespective of consumer demand. The consequence is the unreasonable further 
stifling of competition by consolidating out-of-market broadcast agreements 
through the MLB. 
The court could also look to the Supreme Court’s findings in NCAA and 
observe the striking similarities between the underlying facts in that case and 
the impact of the HTTs on consumers in Southern Nevada. Specifically, the 
NCAA court found that the NCAA’s television plan restricted the ability of 
NCAA members to sell television rights, and absent those restrictions, many 
more games would have been shown on television.150 Thus, the television plan 
was an output restriction having the effect of raising the prices paid for televi-
sion rights.151 Further, the NCAA’s price structure was unresponsive to viewer 
demand and unrelated to the prices that would prevail in a competitive mar-
ket.152 Finally, the television plan dictated who was able to procure television 
rights, which effectively destroyed free market competition for live game tele-
casts.153 
To proceed with a private consumer challenge, Southern Nevadans would 
need to establish that they have antitrust standing. In a vacuum, this complaint 
would allege that the consumer experienced a blackout as a consequence of the 
MLB’s HTT designation, and that broadcasters charged supracompetitive pric-
es for the consumer to view the desired games. The court would look for cir-
cumstances as discussed above: a consumer who has purchased presumably 
comprehensive broadcasting of live games is forced to pay a supracompetitive 
amount to secure the ability to watch any one of the six teams who claim 
Southern Nevada within their HTT through a distributor secured via an exclu-
sive RSN agreement. Southern Nevadans can align their complaint with the ar-
guments presented by the Laumann154 plaintiffs by articulating injuries to com-
petition with regard to distribution agreements of both in- and out-of-market 
games. 
A Southern Nevada consumer-based challenge would allow a prospective 
class from a disproportionately impacted market to subject the archaic Baseball 
Exemption to further judicial scrutiny. Provided that a plaintiff class could sat-
isfy its initial burden of establishing a violation of antitrust law—the burden 
would then shift to the MLB, its respective Clubs, and RSNs to either: (1) pro-
                                                        
149  See generally id. 
150  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 105. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. at 106. 
153  Id. at 108. 
154  See generally Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465. 
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vide evidence of the pro-competitive effects of the HTTs and resulting broad-
casting agreements; or, if no such effect exists, (2) evidence how, absent the 
protections of the Baseball Exemption, the restraints posed by these agreements 
are essential for live game telecasts to be available at all. In short, a Southern 
Nevada challenge could allow courts to revisit the issues posed, and left yet un-
resolved, by the Laumann case while highlighting the additional impacts par-
ticular to the Southern Nevada market.155 
F. Consumer Recourse 
Unfortunately, one of the biggest problems for baseball fans is that the 
Baseball Exemption, and the lack of transparency in broadcasting agreements, 
leaves consumers without apparent avenues of recovery.156  
For example, the Oakland A’s recently explored the possibility of moving 
to a new stadium in San Jose.157 The MLB blocked the move, determining that 
San Jose fell squarely within the operating territory of the San Francisco Gi-
ants.158 To relocate to another team’s territory, at least three-fourths of MLB 
Clubs must agree to the A’s proposed move.159 Although the City of San Jose 
brought suit against the MLB, asserting that the Baseball Exemption did not 
extend to the issue of franchise relocation, the courts were not persuaded.160 Af-
ter losing in both the federal district court161 and the Ninth Circuit,162 the City 
of San Jose appealed to the United State Supreme Court in the hopes that the 
                                                        
155  See generally id. 
156  It is not just MLB fans who find themselves without recourse; even MLB teams are be-
holden to the anomalistic features of the Baseball Exemption, as discussed supra note 5. 
157  Zachary Zagger, San Jose Loss Shows MLB Antitrust Immunity Is Here to Stay, LAW360, 
(October 6, 2015, 9:32 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/711475/san-jose-loss-shows-
mlb-antitrust-immunity-is-here-to-stay [https://perma.cc/LY8U-LLNU]. 
158  Id. 
159  MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. VIII, § 9, http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/SportsEnt 
Law_Institute/League%20Constitutions%20&%20Bylaws/MLConsititutionJune2005Update
.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA4S-EX5R] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
160  San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 776 F.3d 686, 687 (9th Cir. 2015) cert 
denied 136 S. Ct. 36 (2015) (“The City of San Jose steps up to the plate to challenge the 
baseball industry’s 92-year old exemption from the antitrust laws. It joins the long line of 
litigants that have sought to overturn one of federal law’s most enduring anomalies.”). 
161  San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 5:13-cv-02787-RMW, 2014 WL 
7670300 at *1 (Jan. 3, 2014 N.D. Cal.). 
162  Affirming the district court’s dismissal of the majority of San Jose’s claims against the 
MLB based upon the Baseball Exemption, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals wrote:  
Like Casey, San Jose has struck out here. The scope of the Supreme Court’s holding in Flood 
plainly extends to questions of franchise relocation. San Jose is, at bottom, asking us to deem 
Flood wrongly decided, and that we cannot do. Only Congress and the Supreme Court are em-
powered to question Flood’s continued vitality, and with it, the fate of baseball’s singular and 
historic exemption from the antitrust laws. 
 San Jose, 776 F.3d at 692. 
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Court would reconsider its stance that the “business of baseball” was above an-
titrust law; the Court denied certiorari.163  
 In the current landscape, it seems as though consumers—both private in-
dividuals and business owners—are stuck. Traditional avenues of consumer re-
covery—such as private litigation, state parens patriae actions,164 direct cus-
tomer complaints, and the like—provide little reprieve from corporate activity 
that remains untouched due to the standing Exemption. Consumers of other tra-
ditional goods and services, like an individual shopping for a used car, may be 
protected by state lemon laws165 or can—at the very least—file a complaint 
with the Better Business Bureau.166 Here, the unanticipated content drought is 
one bolstered by a nearly 100-year-old status quo. 
For the time being, Southern Nevada consumers looking to enjoy up to 40 
percent of live MLB game telecasts must hope that their cable or satellite pro-
viders have contracted with the proper RSNs chosen by the six teams staking 
claim to the region. Unfortunately, with the Baseball Exemption firmly in place 
and few legal challenges on the horizon,167 baseball fans—like our hypothetical 
                                                        
163  See generally Zagger, supra note 157; see also San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of 
Baseball, 136 S. Ct. 36. 
164  Some State Attorneys General pursue parens patriae actions on behalf of citizens for 
antitrust violations and deceptive trade practices. Though not considered to be a direct reme-
dy to the consumer, state representative actions have been regarded as a significant preventa-
tive measure and deterrent against anticompetitive corporate behavior. See generally JAY L. 
HIMES, STATE PARENS PATRIAE AUTHORITY: THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S AUTHORITY (2004), http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-state 
/pdf/publications/other-pubs/parens.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU4V-LECH]. 
In some circumstances, parens patriae actions can yield more direct benefits to consumers 
by bolstering the State coffers with funds earmarked to address the harm caused by the anti-
competitive action. For example, State Attorneys General were integral in the joint state and 
federal settlements involving residential mortgage foreclosures and loan servicing, informal-
ly known collectively as “the National Mortgage Settlement.” See Joint State-Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Servicing Settlements, NAT’L MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT, http://www.national 
mortgagesettlement.com [https://perma.cc/HRR2-BZ5C] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). Of the 
$57,368,430 settlement Nevada garnered in one of those suits, roughly $11.7 million was 
earmarked to create a dedicated call center staffed by housing counselors. See National 
Mortgage Settlement Summary, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/re 
search/financial-services-and-commerce/national-mortgage-settlement-summary.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/9D2A-EM95] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016); see also About Home Again, 
HOME AGAIN NEV. HOMEOWNER RELIEF PROGRAM, http://www.homeagainnevada.gov/about 
[https://perma.cc/TNS9-H4WG] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). The funds provided some re-
course to Nevada consumers through the development of resources for those who may have 
been impacted by the residential mortgage crisis. Id. 
165 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 597.682–688 (2010) (Nevada’s lemon law buyback statute, 
providing traditional protections for consumers purchasing defective motor vehicles). 
166  BETTER BUS. BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org [https://perma.cc/QD52-KZG7] (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2016) (a well-known nonprofit organization focusing on consumer protection by 
consolidating customer reviews and facilitating dispute resolution through industry self-
regulation). 
167  It is worth reiterating that, at the time of this writing, the Laumann case in the Southern 
District of New York was approaching settlement approval rather than proceeding to trial. 
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Cardinals fan Phil—may have to suffer broadcasting blackouts for the foresee-
able future. 
CONCLUSION 
It may seem as though challenging the Baseball Exemption is a Sisyphean 
effort,168 given the enduring reliance on stare decisis. However, as detailed 
above, legislative efforts are starting to narrow the broad reach of the Baseball 
Exemption. Perhaps more importantly, the 1972 Flood decision acknowledged 
that baseball is a business, and that—as a business—it is engaged in interstate 
commerce.169 Thus, the foundation for change has already been laid. The Su-
preme Court’s decision to deny certiorari to the City of San Jose need not be 
the harbinger of enduring futility that some believe it to be; although the Court 
declined to review the application of the Baseball Exemption in the context of a 
franchise relocation, the Court has yet to hear a consumer-based challenge.  
Despite the Supreme Court’s hesitation in overturning or limiting the 
Baseball Exemption, it is possible that a consumer-based challenge would im-
plicate principles of antitrust law that previous lawsuits have not. While some 
courts have thought it unfair to extinguish the Baseball Exemption, after letting 
the MLB operate under its guise for nearly a century, only Judge Scheindlin of 
the Southern District of New York has witnessed firsthand the manner in which 
the MLB treats its fans under the protections afforded to them by their per-
ceived immunity.170 Although the pending settlement will likely allow the 
MLB to avoid adjudication on the merits, Judge Scheindlin’s opinion was clear; 
unilaterally and arbitrarily allocating consumers among Clubs, and using those 
allocations to manufacture demand is not part and parcel “the business of base-
ball.”171 
                                                                                                                                
See generally Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465 (2012). The proposed 
settlement terms discussed in supra note 97 do not impact the HTT designations in Nevada, 
and the resolution of the matter leaves the application of the Baseball Exemption untested for 
higher courts. 
168  The authors note that challenging the longstanding exemption outright, regardless of the 
legal grounds, is likely an act of futility. In circumstances like those presented in Southern 
Nevada at the time of writing, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which any possible anti-
trust violation has occurred, only that principles of antitrust law are evoked by an apparent 
impact on competition and ultimate consumers. Taking this situation as an opportunity to 
invalidate, in its entirety, one of the principles upon which the business of Major League 
Baseball has developed is not unlike the mythical plight of Sisyphus: an uphill battle that 
will invariably leave challengers exactly where they started. See Sisyphus, ENCYCLOPÆDIA 
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Sisyphus [https://perma.cc/Q4MR-3WER] 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2016) (summarizing the Greek myth of Sisyphus, a king of Corinth who 
was punished in death by having to eternally push a boulder up a hill only to have it roll back 
down to where he began). 
169  See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972). 
170  Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465. 
171  Id. 
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If a consumer class brought suit challenging the anticompetitive effects of 
the HTTs—specifically, asserting that their existence has unlawfully restrained 
trade by restricting output and inflating prices disproportionately in Southern 
Nevada compared to other markets—the Court may be compelled to apply a 
rule of reason analysis to the application of the Baseball Exemption on live 
game telecasts. This could result in a long-overdue reassessment of the Base-
ball Exemption, and could benefit Southern Nevada baseball fans.  
Recent challenges like the Laumann172 case indicate that consumers around 
the country are dissatisfied, and that courts are becoming progressively more 
receptive to evaluating the Baseball Exemption in light of its current impact ra-
ther than the historical status that has allowed it to survive to this day.173  
The appropriate remedy, at least for Southern Nevada, could be derived 
through eliminating HTTs entirely. Unless a particular Club can offer a com-
pelling and verifiable justification for its hold over the territory that would 
withstand rule of reason scrutiny, the MLB could be precluded from continuing 
any territorial telecasting restrictions. Removing this restraint, for example, 
would allow telecasters other than previously prescribed RSNs to compete for 
coverage and consumers, while allowing MLB clubs to retain interest in their 
home operating territories. Broadcasters would regain an opportunity to obtain 
the rights to game broadcasts notwithstanding the territorial lines drawn by the 
MLB. Importantly, those individuals, business operators, advertisers, and other 
consumers who invest in broadcasting with the expectation of access to games 
would not be left wondering why the anticipated festivities have been replaced 





                                                        
172  Id. 
173  Id. at 492. 
